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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann., Section 78-2a-3(2)(c) (1986), and Utah Code 
Ann. Section 77-35-26(2)(a) (1987) whereby a defendant in a 
criminal case may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a 
final judgment of conviction. In this case, the Appellant was 
found guilty after a jury trial held in the Fifth Circuit 
Court, Salt Lake County, West Valley Department, the Honorable 
Tyrone E. Medley presiding. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 41-6-44(1)(a) (1987) 
It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this 
section for any person to operate or be in actual 
physical control of a vehicle within this state if the 
person has a blood or breath alcohol content of .08% 
or greater by weight as shown by a chemical test given 
within two hours after the alleged operation or 
physical control, or if the person is under the 
influence of alcohol and any other drug to a degree 
which renders the person incapable of safely operating 
a vehicle. 
UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 41-6-44.3 (1987) 
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public 
Safety shall establish standards for the 
administration and interpretation of chemical analysis 
of a person's breath, including standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is 
material to prove that a person was operating or in 
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or any drug or operating with a 
blood or breath alcohol content statutorily 
prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records 
of acts, conditions, or events to prove that the 
analysis was made and the instrument used was accurate 
according to standards established in Subsection (1), 
are admissible if: 
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the* regular 
course of the investigation at or about the time the 
act, condition, or event; and 
(b) the source of information from which made and 
method and circumstances of their preparation indicate 
their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established 
under Subsection (2) have been met, there is a 
presumption that the test results are valid and 
further foundation for introduction to the evidence is 
unnecessary. 
iv 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
Case No. 880095-CA 
TONI L. VIGIL, : Priority #2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts have in the most part been adequately 
presented by the Appellant. The State will present additional 
facts that they feel were inadequately presented by the 
Appellant. 
Trooper Poplemeyer upon initially seeing the 
Appellant's car crossing a lane marker by 1 1/2 ft. pulled next 
to the car at which time the Appellant's car again crossed the 
lane marker coming within 2 ft. of the Trooper's vehicle. (Tr. 
p. 61-61). The Trooper then observed the Appellant's car make 
an abrupt turn toward a curve then straighten out and proceed 
forward through the intersection in a clearly marked turning 
lane. (Tr. p. 62-63). When the Appellant made a right hand 
turn onto 5600 West, she went into the left hand turning lane 
of the oncoming traffic and then went back into the proper 
lane. (Tr. p. 63). Trooper Poplemeyer testified that he did 
not observe any chuckholes or other obstructions that would 
cause the appellant to swerve. (Tr. p. 69, 73). 
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After the Trooper pulled the vehicle over and 
contacted the Appellant he noticed a very strong odor of an 
alcoholic beverage emanating from the vehicle. He also noticed 
that the alcoholic odor was coming from the Appellant. (Tr. p. 
74, 76). After exiting her vehicle the Appellant had some 
difficulty with her balance and admitted having a few drinks 
earlier. (Tr. p. 75-76). Although the Appellant was wearing 
high heel shoes upon exiting her car, she removed them and was 
unable to properly perform the heel to toe sobriety test. (Tr. 
p. 85, 87) . 
Trooper Poplemeyer was qualified to administer the 
intoxilyzer test. (Tr. p. 93). Poplemeyer operated the 
intoxilyzer in accordance with his training and certification 
and properly completed the operational checklist when he 
administered the test to the Appellant. (Tr. p. 94-95). 
Poplemeyer before administering the breath test checked the 
Appellant's mouth and observed her for fifteen minutes making 
sure that nothing was put into her mouth. (Tr. p. 91). The 
breath test was administered within two hours of the driving. 
(Tr. p. 95, 98). Poplemeyer observed the Appellant give an 
adequate breath sample and the machine printed out a result 
which matched the digital read out on the machine. (Tr. p. 
95-97) . He kept the checklist and results in a safe place and 
observed that they were the same as on the test night. (Tr. p. 
96-98). 
Trooper Zdunich a qualified expert who regularly 
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maintains the intoxilyz-er testified that on October 3, 1987,the 
intoxilyzer was working properly based on the fact that the 
defective power connector would have rendered the machine 
completely inoperable and there could have been no test result 
if the power connector had been broken on that date. (Tr. p. 
117-118). Zdunich further testified that the results of the 
breath test would be accurate if the operational checklist was 
properly followed by the operator. (Tr. p. 119). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The State argues that foundation was properly laid 
since a presumption that an intoxilyzer is functioning properly 
is raised when the intoxilyzer is regularly maintained pursuant 
to Department of Public Safety standards as was done in the 
present case. Further, the State went beyond the statutory 
requirement to raise a presumption, and presented additional 
expert testimony that the intoxilyzer functioned properly on 
the date in question. Thus foundation was properly laid 
pursuant to both statutory or any other evidentary standards. 
2. Regardless of the evidence concerning the intoxilyzer 
results, ample evidence was presented that establishes a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury would have reached the same 
verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE STATE LAID ADEQUATE FOUNDATION TO 











ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE PROPER. 
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In Murray Citv v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983), the 
Utah Supreme Court stated that Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-44.3 
(1983): 
is merely a codification of the findings 
necessary to establish a proper foundation for 
the introduction of breathalyzer evidence. It is 
a legislative recognition of the universal 
acceptance of the reliability of such evidence* 
Murray City, at 1320. 
Thus, if pursuant to Section 41-6-44.3 the State submits 
evidence regarding the proper maintenance, functioning and 
accuracy of a breathalyzer and the trial judge finds that: 
(1) the calibration and testing for accuracy of 
the breathalyzer were performed in accordance 
with the standards established by the 
Commissioner of Public Safety, (2) the affidavits 
were prepared in the regular course of the public 
officer's duties, (3) that they were prepared 
contemporaneously with the act, condition or 
event, and (4) the "source of information from 
which made and the method and circumstances of 
the preparation were such as to indicate their 
trustworthiness" ... those affidavits establish a 
rebuttable presumption that the breathalyzer 
machine was functioning properly. 
Murray City, at 1320, 1321. 
As Murray City holds, proper foundation is laid and a 
rebuttable presumption is created that a breathalyzer 
functioned properly when the State shows that it was tested and 
maintained pursuant to standards established by the 
Commissioner of Public Safety. This Court has also applied the 
Murray City holding to intoxilyzer machines as was used in the 
present case. Triplett v. Schwendiman, 754 P.2d 87 (Utah App. 
1988). Further, Triplett reveals that the Department of Public 
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Safety's standard for the proper testing of intoxilyzers to 
determine that they are functioning properly need only occur 
every forty days. Thus, if an intoxilyzer is tested and found 
functioning properly, a presumption is established that the 
intoxilyzer is functioning properly until it must be tested 
again forty days later. Contrary to what the defendant 
asserts, there is no requirement pursuant to Utah Court 
decisions or statutory and administrative standards that the 
State must go beyond the requirements of Section 41-6-44.3 and 
its supplemental Department of Public Safety standards to lay 
proper foundation on an intoxilyzer's admissiblity into 
evidence. Consequently, once an intoxilyzer has been shown to 
be properly tested the defendant has the burden of showing the 
machine was not functioning properly when it was administered 
to him. Triplett, at 88, 89. 
The Appellant admits in his brief that the intoxilyzer 
machine in the present case was regularly maintained. (Brief 
of Appellant at 10). The Appellant only argues that since the 
intoxilyzer was found to be nonfunctional due to a corroded 
power source connector ten days after the appellant was 
administered a breath test, the State could not lay proper 
foundation for admission of the breath test unless they tested 
the machine after the appellant was administered a breath test 
and before the malfunction was discovered. In State v. 
Palomino, 587 P.2d 107 (Or.App. 1978), which was cited by this 
Court in Triplett, an Oregon appellate court on facts similar 
to the present case stated: 
- 5 -
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Defendant's argument, carried to its logical 
conclusion, would mean that if at the end of a 
... certification period the machine was found to 
be malfunctioning, all blood alcohol tests 
conducted since that last certification would be 
inadmissible. It is unlikely the legislature 
intended that result to follow from the machine 
certification procedure. 
The state laid proper foundation ... . Any 
malfunction detected subsequent to this 
certification does not preclude admission of the 
test results. The discovered failure only 
reflects upon the weight to be accorded the test 
results. We cannot assume as a matter of law 
that the machine was inaccurate on the day the 
defendant was tested. 
Palomino, at 109. 
A Missouri appellate court decision also held that a 
malfunction found fourteen days after the defendant was given 
the breath test, does not effect the admissibility of the 
test. State v. Powers, 690 S.W.2d 859 (Mo.App. 1985). The 
appellant in contrast argues that the Baker rule as applied in 
Utah requires that intoxilyzers for foundational purposes must 
be checked and shown to be functioning properly both before and 
after a defendant is tested. However, the Utah Supreme Court 
has stated that the Baker rule does not require repeated 
testing to confirm the accuracy of each breath test given. 
Lavton Citv v. Watson, 733 P.2d 499, 501 (Utah 1987); State In 
Interest of K. K. H. , 610 P.2d 849, 853 (Utah 1980). The law 
in Utah is best stated by this Court in Triplett, where this 
Court held "if the standards set by the commissioner of public 
safety are satisfied, as they have been in the present case, 
the results of a breath test are presumed to be valid." 
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Triplett, at 89. Since, the standards set by the commissioner 
were satisfied in this case, and the appellant himself does not 
question whether the intoxilyzer machine was regularly 
maintained, the results are presumed to be valid. The fact the 
intoxilyzer which was tested and found to function perfectly 
four days before the appellant was administered a breath test, 
and then ten days later developed a power source connector 
problem cannot make the breath test inadmissible, particularly 
since the intoxilyzer would shut down and not give any reading 
during such a malfunction. 
Since Section 41-6-44.3 concerns the foundational 
requirements of affidavits and documents, rather than in person 
testimony concerning the proper functioning of the intoxilyzer 
as was done in the present case, it might be argued that 
Section 41-6-44.3 does not specifically apply. Whether Section 
41-6-44.3 applies or another foundational requirement as 
asserted by the Appellant applies, the State has nevertheless 
laid proper foundation. The Appellant contends that the State 
must show for foundational purposes that the machine was 
checked and shown to be functioning properly both before and 
after a defendant is tested in order to comply with the Baker 
rule. What Baker actually requires before a test result is 
admissible is "(1) that the machine was properly checked and in 
proper working order at the time of conducting the test 
(emphasis added) .... (3) that the subject had nothing in his 
mouth at the time of the test and that he had taken no food or 
- 7 -
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drink within 15 minutes prior to taking the test; (4) that the 
test be given by a qualified operator and in the proper 
manner." State v. Baker, 355 P.2d 806, 809 (Wash. 1960) ( (2) 
was inapplicable to intoxilyzers since they do not involve the 
use of ampoules.) 
The State contends that it has properly established* 
each of these foundational requirements for admissibility of 
the intoxilyzer results. The State showed the following 
through the testimony of the arresting officer, Trooper 
Popelmeyer: 
(1) That he checked the defendant's mouth and found 
nothing in it 15 minutes prior to giving the defendant the 
intoxilyzer test. 
(2) That he observed that the defendant did not eat, 
drink, or place anything into her mouth during the 15 minute 
period prior to the test, 
(3) That he was a certified intoxilyzer operator on 
the date of the test, 
(4) That he operated the intoxilyzer in accordance 
with his training and certification on the test date, 
(5) That he properly completed the operational 
checklist for the intoxilyzer test given to defendant as he was 
trained , 
(6) That he observed defendant give an adequate 
breath sample and the response of the machine, 
(7) That he observed the machine to print out a 
- 8 -
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result which matched the digital readout on the machine, 
(8) That he kept the checklist and results in a safe 
place and observed that they were the same as on the test night. 
The State further showed through the testimony of 
Trooper Zdunich the following: 
(1) That he was qualified by the court to be an 
expert in the repairs and operation of the intoxilyzer after 
having given extensive testimony as to his training, his 
certification and recertification classes, his attendance at an 
operator class, an instrument maintenance class, a testing 
expert supervisor class, and a standardized field sobriety 
testing course, 
(2) That he has the responsibility as a technician to 
test and maintain the intoxilyzer machine on a regular basis, 
(3) That he is in charge of taking care of the 
affidavits for all of Utah in regards to maintenance and 
operation of intoxilyzers, court testimony and instruction on 
the machine to police officers and others, 
(4) That he understood and explained to the Jury the 
functioning of the intoxilyzer, 
(5) That he personally tested the intoxilyzer in 
question, 
(6) That this intoxilyzer was functioning properly on 
September 30, 1987, three days prior to the test date and 
further gave specifics as to the procedures he used to properly 
establish this, 
- 9 -
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(7) That he received a complaint on October 13, 1987, 
ten days after the test date, that the machine would not work, 
(8) That as he began to test the machine he 
determined that it would not turn on because the power 
connector was defective, 
(9) That he replaced the power connector, then fully 
tested the machine, determining that it then worked and that 
the only problem with the machine had been the power connector, 
10) That on October 3, 1987, this intoxilyzer was 
working properly based on the fact that the defective power 
connector would have rendered the machine completely inoperable 
and there could have been no test result if the power connector 
had been broken on that date, 
11) That the results of the test would be accurate if 
the operational check list was properly followed by the 
operator. 
From the testimony as presented above, it is clear 
that the State has shown that the intoxilyzer "was properly 
checked and was in proper working order at the time of 
conducting the test." Baker, supra. Furthermore, the State 
has established the other Baker requirements. Consequently, 
the State has properly established a foundation for the 
admissibility of the intoxilyzer results. It then would become 
a question of the weight the Jury wished to afford it. Since a 
result was obtained in the present case while following correct 
procedures, expert testimony established that the intoxilyzer 
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necessarily was functioning properly on the day the appellant 
was tested. The test results • coming from a regularly 
maintained intoxilyzer were an issue of the weight of the 
evidence of which the appellant had an opportunity before a 
jury to attack. 
POINT II. A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD EXISTS THAT THE JURY 
WOULD HAVE REACHED THE SAME RESULT WITHOUT 
EVIDENCE OF THE BREATH TEST. 
Although the intoxilyzer was regularly maintained and 
properly admitted pursuant to the foundational requirements of 
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-44.3 (1987), a reasonable 
likelihood exists that the jury would have reached the same 
result without evidence of the breath test. Trooper Poplemeyer 
observed the appellant cross over lane markers three times at 
one time almost hitting the side of his vehicle on a well 
maintained road. Poplemeyer observed the appellant abruptly 
swerve toward a curve and then proceed through an intersection 
while in a well marked turning lane. The appellant had alcohol 
on her breath, trouble at times with her balance and could not 
complete properly the heel to toe sobriety test. Finally, the 
appellant herself admitted drinking six beers at a bar that 
evening. 
- 11 -
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence of the intoxilyzer was admitted into 
evidence upon proper foundation. Further, the jury decision 
would have been the same irrespective of the intoxilyzer' s 
admission. Thus, the State asks this Court to affirm the 
conviction. 
Respectfully submitted this day of August, 1988. 
f. Ch^SL+^3 
VIRGINIA L. CHRISTENSEN 
Deputy County Attorney 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Association, 430 East 500 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, this 26th day of August, 1988. 
jLMj^U^J 
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